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Increasingly, developing countries embrace foreign direct investment (FDI) and simultane-
ously pursue economic integration with developed countries. Foreign investment is subject to
sovereign risk and free trade agreements may serve as a commitment mechanism in order to
achieve higher sustainable levels of FDI. This paper shows that such agreements, by inducing
sunk investments in expanding export sectors, can indeed increase the level of self-enforcing
FDI. While one might expect FDI from any source to increase, the analysis shows that this
need not be true for FDI originating in non-partner countries even though export-platform type
FDI will rise. The reason is the oﬀsetting eﬀect from trade diversion, which diminishes the
ability to retaliate should a host country renege on its ex ante commitment to a foreign investor.
The choice of partner is thus crucial for a country’s ability to attract FDI through economic
integration.
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One of the salient developments in the world economy over the last few years has been the surge
in free trade agreements (FTAs). About 130 regional trade agreements have been notiﬁed since
the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 alone. This compares to a total of
some 250 notiﬁed agreements since the end of World War II. Over 170 are currently in force. These
include such well-known arrangements as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or Mercosur in the Americas. It also includes
a large number of small agreements that typically involve a free trade or cooperation arrangement
of one country with an established trading bloc. The European Union (EU) has been most active
in this way, although there are numerous bi- and trilateral agreements all over the world.1
The characteristics of these agreements diﬀer so fundamentally from the types of agreements
seen in the 1950s and 1960s that this wave of regionalism has been dubbed the “new regionalism”
(Ethier 1998a). The “old” regionalism usually combined similar countries. The most successful
ones were among developed, the less successful among developing countries. Many of the recent
arrangements, in contrast, consist of a small, often developing country teaming up with a large,
usually developed country or established trading bloc.
From a traditional trade economist’s point of view, the proliferation of such FTAs is surprising.
Since liberalization is in large part undertaken by the small country as the developed country’s trade
barriers were small to begin with, the traditional gains from trade should be small. Thus, it has
been suggested that instead, developing countries’ main motivation for pursuing these agreements
is a desire to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).2
1Even though ten more countries have recently joined the EU formally, many free trade arrangements with
Mediterranean and increasingly Latin American countries, e.g. with Chile since February of 2003, remain. See the
WTO web site at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm for links to a list of notiﬁed regional
trade agreements.
2See Ethier (1998a). Tornell and Esquivel (1997) make this argument with respect to NAFTA, pointing out that
entering negotiations it was Mexico’s clearly stated objective to increase its attractiveness to foreign investors.
1Developing countries, especially those with a history of arbitrary or even hostile treatment
of FDI, face a standard time inconsistency problem. Ex ante, foreign investors are assured that
they would receive national treatment. Ex post, there is an incentive to renege and fully tax
(expropriate) investment instead. This is especially true for FDI which, unlike portfolio investment,
is characterized by often substantial sunk investments, and therefore tends to be lumpy.
Unilateral reforms and the multilateral trading system can help alleviate this commitment prob-
lem, but preferential agreements can do more. It is relatively easy to retract unilateral reforms.
Despite attempts at improving enforcement, the multilateral system eﬀectively lags a credible en-
forcement mechanism (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1990, 1997b). Regional integration, on the other
hand, can function as a commitment device.
The intuition is straightforward. Consider a small and a large country, such as Mexico and
the United States. After the conclusion of a trade agreement between them, private agents in the
small country make investments that are either irreversible or costly to reverse in the sectors that
beneﬁt from increased trade due to the standard trade creation eﬀect. These sunk investments
are the source of the commitment value of the trade agreement for the small country. They
increase the punishment value to the large country should the partner renege on her commitment
to provide national treatment for foreign investors. This setup is similar in spirit to McLaren
(1997). The crucial diﬀerence is that he assumes that sunk investments are made in anticipation of
a trade agreement, which diminishes the small country’s bargaining power. Here, in contrast, sunk
investments are assumed to be made once the FTA has been concluded.3
While attitudes towards FDI in many developing countries have been mixed at best in the past,
they started changing about the same time countries began to open up their economies and pursue
3Note that this is diﬀerent from the insurance motive as explored for instance by Whalley (1998). He interprets
the motive of a small country joining a regional agreement with its main trading partner as insurance in case of a
future global trade war. The regional arrangement assures the small country market access in such an event, thereby
reducing the adverse welfare eﬀects of the trade war.
2FTAs. There is ample theoretical support for the beneﬁcial eﬀects of FDI in developing countries
in particular, dating at least as far back as Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and more formally Murphy
et al. (1989). Both emphasize the importance of foreign capital to achieve a certain degree of
industrialization in an initially capital-poor country and the potential for technological spillovers.
In the context of NAFTA, computable general equilibrium models have found that increased FDI
increases NAFTA’s welfare gains for Mexico from under 2%, when only tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers
are removed, to between 4.5 and 6.8%. Young and Romero (1994), who consider an improvement
in investor conﬁdence that decreases the risk premium on investment in Mexico by 2.5 percentage
points, ﬁnd welfare beneﬁts up to 11% in their dynamic model. Empirically, Aitken and Harrison
(1999) ﬁnd some evidence of positive spillovers of FDI in Venezuela, while Borensztein et al. (1998)
ﬁnd positive eﬀects on growth in a cross-section of developing countries.
FDI in developing countries has been rising considerably since the advent of the new regionalism.
By the end of the 1990’s, developing countries’ share of the world inward stock of FDI had increased
to over 30%, from just over 20% a decade earlier (UNCTAD 2000). Of the top 20 recipients 1999-
2001 as measured by the share of world inward FDI relative to GDP share, twelve countries were
either developing or transition countries (UNCTAD 2003). Most outward FDI, in contrast, keeps
originating in developed countries.
The principal aim of the paper is to formally investigate the eﬀect of the commitment value of
an FTA between a small developing and a developed country on inward foreign direct investment
in the developing country. In doing so, the focus is on the potentially diﬀerential eﬀect on FDI
originating in the partner country versus FDI from third countries. Intuitively, one might expect
FDI from any source to increase. The trade creation eﬀect should lead to an increase from the
partner, as pointed out above. Moreover, the developing country, presumably a low-wage location,
should become more attractive for export-platform type investment. On the other hand, trade with
3non-partner countries may fall due to the trade diversion eﬀect, thus diminishing the commitment
value with respect to that set of countries. Consequently, the possibility of less equilibrium FDI
from these exists and the paper examines the conditions under which such an outcome will obtain.
The analysis thus shows that the choice of partner is crucial in determining how much foreign
investment a country is able to attract due to integration. Teaming up with a major trading
partner is potentially more beneﬁcial than turning to one’s geographic neighbors. This can help
explain, e.g., why Chile, after its eﬀorts to join NAFTA failed, turned to the European Union rather
than its Latin American neighbors in pursuit of a trade agreement.
The work of Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel (1998) is closest in spirit to ours. Their analysis, how-
ever, focuses on the possible investment diverting eﬀect for other developing countries. Moreover,
an important shortcoming of their paper is that they do not consider the lumpy nature of FDI, but
model foreign capital ﬂows as smooth. In contrast, this particular characteristic of FDI is explicitly
considered here and central to the ﬁndings. In analyzing the eﬀect of economic integration among
industrialized countries on FDI, Motta and Norman (1996) have shown that FDI by outside coun-
tries may not increase since integration may increase the competitiveness of intra-regional ﬁrms
suﬃciently to deter outside ﬁrms from entering the market in the form of FDI, while they may still
export if outside trade barriers are not too high. Raﬀ (2002) considers the diﬀerential eﬀects of
free trade agreements and customs unions on location choice of multinationals and ﬁnds that tax
competition for FDI may result in lower social welfare in a free trade area, creating a role for a
customs union.
Of course, factors such as proximity to major markets, infrastructure, skill level of the labor
force, taxes, and exchange rate movements also help determine the magnitude of inward FDI as they
diﬀer across countries. This paper does not attempt to specify a full model of the determinants of
FDI in developing countries nor a model of the multinational ﬁrm. Instead, it analyzes one speciﬁc
4channel through which a country may improve its attractiveness to foreign investors, all else equal.4
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the issues of integration, commitment and
punishment in more detail, which serves to justify the model setup. Section 3 presents the model,
with results following in section 4. Section 5 discusses some empirical and policy implications.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Integration, Commitment, and Punishment
This section brieﬂy discusses some issues that are pertinent to foreign direct investment in a de-
veloping country, which serves to justify the main features of the model. These are the typical
economic opening path of developing countries, culminating in the “new regionalism”, the commit-
ment problem regarding FDI and the appropriate punishment following violation of the pledge of
national treatment of foreign investors.
The analysis focuses on how regional integration in addition to participation in the multilateral
regime aﬀects inward FDI. This is motivated by the observation that typically a developing country
does not move directly from autarky to a new regionalism-type FTA, but begins with unilateral
reforms. This is then followed by relying less on exceptions historically granted by the GATT/WTO
for developing countries. Some countries did not even join the GATT until after they had begun to
open up their economy. The surge in regional agreements has followed these earlier developments.
A case in point is Mexico, which joined the GATT in 1986, while also implementing unilateral trade
and investment reforms, with NAFTA going into eﬀect only in 1994. Eastern European transition
countries have pursued all strategies simultaneously. Thus, an analysis which were to take autarky
as the starting point would likely overstate the eﬀect of regional integration.5
4For a fuller discussion of determinants of FDI in developing countries see Singh and Jun (1996) and Fernandez-
Arias (1996). A uniﬁed model of the determinants of multinational activity can be found in Markusen (2002).
5This is a slight departure from Ethier (1998a) who argues that another purpose of joining regional agreements for
5In trying to attract foreign investment, developing countries face a standard time inconsistency
problem. Ex ante, they commit to national treatment of foreign investors, implying a tax rate
no greater than that faced by domestic investors. Ex post, it may be preferable to tax foreign
investors at a higher rate. The equilibrium level of FDI is then constrained by the availability
of credible punishments and commitment technologies. Punishment can take on various forms.
Direct punishment implies that should foreign investors be expropriated, no FDI will materialize
in future periods.6 Since the units of observation are sovereign nations, credible equilibria must be
self-enforcing.7 A self-enforcing policy is deﬁned as a policy that can be sustained under the most
severe punishment that can credibly be threatened against the party committing the oﬀense. This
is restricting the analysis to trigger strategy equilibria. In the context of expropriations it has been
shown that such equilibria, which imply that expropriated investors will never invest in the country
again, are subgame-perfect (Cole and English 1991).
There is also the possibility of indirect punishment, which includes the use of trade sanctions
following expropriation. The advantage over direct punishment is that it can be employed imme-
diately. It can take several forms. Exports from the expropriating to the expropriated country
may face higher trade barriers, exports going the other way may be blocked or reduced, and ﬁnan-
cial sanctions may be imposed.8 This issue-linkage has been observed in practice. Hufbauer et al.
(1990) provide a number of case studies of sanctions episodes in which expropriation by one country
has been answered with trade restrictions by the country whose investors were aﬀected. Most cases
developing countries has been to achieve integration into the world economy, which is related to the debate on whether
regional integration will be a step towards or a stumbling block on the road to further multilateral liberalization (see,
e.g., Bagwell and Staiger 1997a and 1997b, Ethier 1998b, Krueger 1997 or the collective articles volume by de Melo
and Panagariya 1993).
6This type of punishment is used in the model of Cole and English (1991). It is similar in spirit to considerations
in the sovereign debt literature. There, if a country fails to repay its debt, it will be cut oﬀ from future lending. For
an overview see Eaton and Fernandez (1995).
7Throughout the paper it is assumed that the interests of foreign investors and their countries are identical and
they act as one.
8Due to the negligible amount of outward developing country FDI, retaliation by expropriation is not considered
a viable option.
6involve the U.S. as the sanctioning party. The sanctioned countries include Mexico, Brazil, Chile,
Peru, Sri Lanka and Ethiopia, among others. These are of course only the most drastic cases in
which expropriation has in fact occurred, but cannot include cases in which the threat of retaliation
was suﬃcient to deter it. As Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) and Raﬀ (1992) have pointed out, ex-
propriation is never actually an equilibrium outcome since a rational multinational ﬁrm would not
invest in a country that pursues a policy of expropriation and currently has a positive net beneﬁto f
doing so. This might explain the low levels of FDI that we see in many countries where investment
is not secure, at least not to the same degree as in otherwise similar countries.
3 The Model
3.1 Setup
The model laid out in this section captures the key features of FDI in a developing country. For any
ﬁrm to set up operations, investments must be made prior to production. They are subsequently
sunk. If they are made by a foreign ﬁrm, they are subject to sovereign risk. When the host
country enters a trade agreement with another country, exports to that country face lower trade
barriers. Both foreign-owned and domestically owned plants increase capacity as a result of the
higher demand. This increases the beneﬁt of taking over a foreign-owned plant, but also the loss
from the cessation of future FDI. The same is true for non-member country ﬁrms if they use the host
country as an export platform. The expansion of capacity (the sunk investment) by domestically
owned ﬁrms, in contrast, only increases the loss from facing trade sanctions as a result of reneging.
Intuitively, export platform exports should always increase the punishment value and hence
FDI. However, the formalization of the model reveals that this is not necessarily so. The intuitive
result does not hold if non-member countries use the host country as an export platform to the
7member, because the trade punishment value does not increase as exports to the home country of
a ﬁrm from a non-member country do not increase as a result of the regional agreement.
Consider the following framework. The world consists of a set of N developed countries and
one small developing country h, the home country.9 Let N b el a r g ea n dc a l lo n eo ft h eN countries
P (which will be home’s partner country). The N countries are identical in every respect, i.e. they
are of the same size, have identical preferences and technology. The home country has two sectors,
a perfectly competitive numeraire sector that produces for the local market and a diﬀerentiated
products export sector, in which foreign investment takes place.10 In home’s export sector, each
variety is also diﬀerentiated by export market due to the presence of (identical) trade costs. These
arise because the product has to be tailored for the speciﬁcm a r k e ti ti sb e i n gs h i p p e dt o ,e . g .
manuals have to be printed in the local language, technical speciﬁcation requirements must be
considered, etc. Preferences everywhere are of the CES-type and completely symmetric in all
export products, so that the same international price p∗
x obtains for every variety. Price is equal to
unit cost in the numeraire sector.
In the export sector, there is a setup cost S for a new factory. As is well known, with symmetric
diﬀerentiated products this implies that a new entrant into the export market will choose to supply
a new variety since this will yield strictly greater proﬁts than entering a market that already has a
competitor (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). This also ensures positive proﬁts during the operation
of the plant.
Workers are heterogeneous in their ability to work in the export sector. Ex ante, abilities are
unobserved so ﬁrms are screening workers and retain only those that turn out to be of high ability.
9There are no other developing countries so that the issue of competition among countries for FDI can be neglected
for this analysis. Lee (1997) illustrates the competition issue in discussing how Korea may be aﬀected by NAFTA.
Fernandez-Arias and Spiegel (1998) analyze the welfare eﬀects on Southern non-members, but their model has no
Northern non-members.
10Empirically, most FDI takes place in order to produce for the local market in developed countries, while the
motive to undertake FDI in developing countries is predominantly to take advantage of lower production cost and
then use them as an export platform. This is true for example for Mexico (Ortiz 1994, p.167).
8Since this is costly, the wage in the export sector for retained workers exceeds the wage in the
non-tradable sector. If a ﬁrm retains a worker, it signals that the worker is of high ability. For
another ﬁrm not to bid away that worker (and save the screening cost) ﬁr m sm u s tp a yw o r k e r so f
known high ability higher wages. If a worker is let go and returns to the labor pool, her ability
will again become unknown since ﬁrms cannot distinguish between previously screened workers and
new ones.11 All workers have identical abilities in the numeraire sector.
Labor is the sole input in production. For convenience, it is scaled such that one unit of labor
produces one unit of output Q in the export sector and is getting paid wx. Workers in the non-
tradable sector receive a wage wn <w x. The gain from foreign investment thus arises from wages
in the export sector exceeding those in the numeraire sector.12
F o r e i g ni n v e s t o r sa r es u b j e c tt os o v e r e i g nr i s ka n dm a yb ee x p r o p r i a t e d . T h ec o s to fe x p r o -
priating a foreign-owned factory consists of several parts. First, countries whose nationals have
been expropriated impose an embargo on output from expropriated facilities (if this output had
been exported back to that country) and impose the Nash tariﬀ τN on all other exports from that
country.13 A country’s Nash tariﬀ τN is the tariﬀ which is optimal given the country’s bargaining
position.14 Since all countries are assumed to be large relative to h,t h i st a r i ﬀ will be positive and
higher than the pre-expropriation tariﬀ.
Secondly, if home expropriates a foreign-owned factory, there is a takeover cost, which captures
costs such as installing new managers, getting acquainted with the operation of the plant and
11See Drazen (1982) for a model of worker heterogeneity in developing countries that shows how observed wage
diﬀerentials constitute an equilibrium.
12Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1996) provide some evidence that foreign-owned ﬁrms (though not exporters in
general) pay higher wages than domestically owned ones and that this gap is persistent in Mexico and Venezuela, the
two developing countries in their study.
13The expropriated country could impose the Nash tariﬀ on all exports by h, including those from expropriated
plants. Assuming that the latter will not be imported, but there will not be a total trade embargo seems most in line
with historical experience. A Nash tariﬀ on all products would not greatly change the results.
14The Nash tariﬀ can be prohibitive, but most likely will not be (Dixit 1987). In order to make a distinction
between imposing the Nash tariﬀ and imposing an outright embargo, it is assumed to be non-prohibitive here.
9losses through the transition period. If output from expropriated plants is exported back to the
expropriated ﬁrm’s home country, a new market for the variety now produced by home must
be found, which is captured in a separate cost term because this cost does not arise if output
was exported to a third country. Both of these costs are a function of the total capacity of the
expropriated plants, which is the number of plants (varieties) times each plant’s capacity. Thirdly,
if a multinational has been expropriated, there will be no further investment in the future.
The following assumptions capture the fact that h is a small developing country. First, it
has no outward FDI. Thus, expropriated countries cannot expropriate in retaliation. Secondly,
wages are suﬃciently low even in the export sector that, absent the threat of expropriation, proﬁt
maximization implies that a multinational from either N or P would produce a new variety in h.
Thirdly, since there is a setup cost for a new plant in the export sector and a new one is needed
to serve a new market, the number of varieties produced by domestic h-ﬁrms is small relative to
the number of known varieties. This is because h is poor and faces imperfect credit markets. In
this setup the gain for h from FDI comes from employing more workers in the export sector which
pays a higher wage than the other sector in the economy. The government is assumed to maximize
national income.
A sas t a r t i n gp o i n t ,h is taken to be open and part of the multilateral trading system. Since all
N countries are identical, so are their import tariﬀs, negotiated multilaterally and set at τm.I ti s
assumed that 0 < τm < τN.W i t hp∗
x determined on the world market and taken as given by all
ﬁrms, identical preferences in each country and symmetry in the export goods, demand for each
diﬀerentiated good is just a function of the respective import tariﬀ. All goods are assumed to be
normal and thus demand is inversely related to the tariﬀ. Each plant serves exactly one market
with one good, so the scale of all plants is identical in the multilateral regime. In this regime, there
are two types of investment. Either a ﬁrm from one of the N countries invests in a variety that
10is exported back to the ﬁrm’s home country market or the output is exported to a third country
market.
In the free trade regime, there are ﬁve types of investment. There is investment from the
partner country, P, which can be either exported back to P, or exported to a non-member market.
Investment from a ﬁrm of a non-member country can be for that ﬁrm’s home country, another
non-member country, or P.
The sequence of events is as follows. Each period, a foreign investor decides how many varieties
to produce in h. For each variety, the setup cost S must be spent. Then, the host country decides
whether to expropriate or not. Then, sales take place and proﬁts are realized. Since all varieties
have identical prices, all plants (within a given type) are of the same scale and punishment is total,
it is rational to expropriate fully if expropriation is to occur. Capital is assumed to depreciate after
one period, so that the setup cost (which includes training export sector workers) must be spent
each period. There are an inﬁnite number of periods.
The lumpiness of FDI is brought out starkly in this model, in that only entire production
facilities can be erected. Thus the number of varieties of any type, s, can only take on integer
values and the net beneﬁt of expropriation is not a continuous function of s. Furthermore, the
beneﬁt function is not deﬁned for s =0since when there is no foreign-owned plant in h of a
particular type, there is nothing to expropriate.
The necessary condition for investment in the monopolistically competitive export sector to
be proﬁtable is given by S ≤ (p∗
x − wx)Lx w h e r ew eh a v em a d eu s eo ft h ef a c tt h a to n ew o r k e r
produces one unit of output. If there is free entry into the export sector, this equation will hold
with equality. The proﬁtability condition is assumed to be satisﬁed for at least some products, but
at most for a ﬁnite number. This might be for several reasons. For example, the more workers are
employed in the export sector already, the more diﬃcult it is to ﬁnd talented workers to retrain for
11the more challenging work in that sector and thus retraining costs may be increasing in the number
of export sector workers. Thus, let the support of s be [1,s],w h e r es is the maximum number of
proﬁtable investment projects and is taken to be exogenous.15
The optimal number of investment projects is determined endogenously by the beneﬁto fe x -
propriation for each level of s. The home country compares total welfare when expropriating the
plant with welfare if the multinational can operate undisturbed. Finally, note that since agents are
rational and have perfect foresight, no expropriation will occur in equilibrium.
3.2 The Multilateral Regime
In the multilateral regime, there are two cases to consider. Either, a ﬁrm from country i exports
back to its home market or exports to a third-country market j. If output is exported back to the
multinational’s own country, the beneﬁt of expropriation in the current period (t =1 )i sg i v e nb y
Bii = si [p∗
xQx (τm) − wxLx (τm)] − D[siQx (τm)] − E [siQx (τm)]
−lh
i [p∗
x (Qx (τm) − Qx (τN)) − wx (Lx (τm) − Lx (τN))] (1)
−lh
i (wx − wn)(Lx (τm) − Lx (τN)) −
∞ X
t=2
βt−1 (wx − wn)siLx (τm)
where si is the number of plants (varieties) operated by ﬁrms of country i, Qx is the output
of a single plant in the export sector as a function of the import tariﬀ, Lx are the units of labor
employed in an export sector plant and lh
i is the number of varieties home exports to i.T h eﬁrst
term gives the gain of expropriating all i-owned plants, given by instantaneous proﬁts. The cost
of expropriation is given by ﬁve distinct cost terms. D[·] i st h ec o s to fﬁnding new markets for
the expropriated variety. Naturally, it is an increasing function of its arguments. The second term
15If one of the determinants of the maximum number of proﬁtable investment projects (varieties) s is how many
workers are already employed in the export sector, then s should be endogenous. When switching from the multina-
tional to the regional regime, the output of all varieties exported to the partner country in the agreement is increasing,
requiring more workers, hence reducing s if the preceding argument applies.
12gives the cost E [·] of taking over an expropriated plant which is also an increasing function of
total capacity of plants taken over. Note that both D and E are decreasing functions of τm.T h e
third term quantiﬁes the cost of lost proﬁts from imposition of the Nash tariﬀ on all varieties home
exports to i. The fourth term gives the cost in terms of reduced wages of workers displaced due to
the punishment. They must ﬁnd employment in the numeraire sector where wages are lower. The
ﬁfth term is the loss from the absence of any future FDI of this type should expropriation occur. It
is given by the discounted loss in national income as the workers that would have been employed
in the foreign export sector work in the numeraire sector instead.
More explicit results can be obtained if the costs of ﬁnding a new market and taking over a pro-
duction facility are linear in the number of plants expropriated (s): D[siQx (τm)] = siD[Qx (τm)]
and E [siQx (τm)] = siE [Qx (τm)]. This assumption is not very restrictive. If one believes that
it becomes more diﬃcult to ﬁnd new markets as the volume of production for which new markets
must be found is increasing, this possibility is not ruled out. While linearity in the number of
plants is assumed, the cost can still be convex in the capacity of any one plant, i.e. as a function of
Qx. Since products are diﬀerentiated, the cost of ﬁnding a new market should be the same for each
product category. The same is true for the cost of taking over an export plant. Any product plant
should have about the same cost of being taken over for a given capacity. Again, neither convexity
nor concavity of cost as a function of the plant capacity is ruled out.
The notation can be simpliﬁed since labor is the only input in production and labor units are
deﬁned such that Qx (τ)=Lx (τ) ∀τ,s ow ew i l lw r i t eL instead of Qx henceforth (dropping the
x-subscript since it always refers to labor employed in the export sector). Combining cost terms
13three and four and simplifying the last one, (1) becomes
Bii = si (p∗
x − wx)L(τm) − siD[L(τm)] − siE [L(τm)] (2)
−lh
i [(p∗




If instead all output from i-operated plants is exported to a third country j, the net beneﬁto f
expropriation becomes
Bij = si (p∗
x − wx)L(τm) − siE [L(τm)] (3)
−lh
i [(p∗




since we assume that j will not retaliate if i-owned plants are expropriated, so there is no cost of
ﬁnding new markets for this output.16
3.3 The Free Trade Regime
Now suppose that home enters a free trade agreement with one of the N countries, P. Without loss
of generality, it is assumed that tariﬀs will be uniformly zero in the FTA, whereas tariﬀs vis-à-vis
non-member countries remain unchanged in accordance with WTO requirements. Thus demand
from P for each variety is now Q(0) >Q(τm). The demand for each variety and hence output of
each variety of the type exported to P has increased. All varieties home is exporting to P have this
higher output, so more of home’s export sector is now oriented towards P. These sunk investments
as a result of the FTA increase the value of the indirect punishment since reversion to the Nash
tariﬀ facing home’s exports to P results in a higher loss. In addition, the gain from future FDI of
this type has increased, which in turn increases the direct punishment value of the loss of future
FDI. However, instantaneous proﬁts are also higher, which increases the beneﬁto fe x p r o p r i a t i o n .
16This is actually not a very restrictive assumption. It can be shown that all results are qualitatively unchanged if
j is allowed to retaliate.
14Now we must distinguish between production considered by a multinational from P versus
production considered by an i-ﬁrm. The beneﬁt of expropriating i-owned plants whose output goes
back to i’s own market or a third country market j that is not part of the FTA is unchanged since
multilateral tariﬀs are unchanged. Hence, the beneﬁt of expropriating that type of investment
continues to be given by equations (2) and (3), respectively. If, however, an i-ﬁrm uses h as an
export platform to P, the net beneﬁt of expropriation for home is now given by
BiP = si (p∗
x − wx)L(0) − siE [L(0)] (4)
−lh
i [(p∗




The capacity of expropriated plants is higher since exports face no tariﬀsi nP,a n ds oi st h e
cost E of taking over such a plant. The loss from other h exports facing the higher Nash tariﬀ,
however, remains unchanged.
Since P is now in a FTA with home, the expressions for the net beneﬁto fe x p r o p r i a t i o no f
P-owned plants are as follows. If P uses h as an export platform for another market j, the net
beneﬁti sg i v e nb y
BPj = sP (p∗
x − wx)L(τm) − sPE [L(τm)] (5)
−lh
P [(p∗





P is the number of plants operated by h that export to P and sP is the number of plants
operated by P. The capacity of the expropriated plant depends on the multilateral tariﬀ since
e x p o r t sg ot oc o u n t r yj which is not a member of the FTA between P and h.H o m e - o w n e dp l a n t s
that export to P now face a greater loss due to their larger capacity before expropriation. The
loss in future FDI depends on the multilateral tariﬀ since the type of investment that is considered
produces for a non-FTA market j.
15If, on the other hand, P’s varieties produced in h are exported back to its own market, the net
beneﬁt becomes
BPP = sP (p∗
x − wx)L(τm) − sPD[L(τm)] − sPE [L(τm)]
−lh
P [(p∗
x − wn)(L(0) − L(τN))] (6)




The capacity of the expropriated plant is given by Q(0) = L(0). When it is expropriated, this
variety can now only be exported to one of the non-FTA countries where it is facing the multilateral
tariﬀ τm. Therefore, only part of the capacity of the expropriated plant may be utilized, lowering
the gain from expropriation. Moreover, the cost D of adapting to this new market raises the cost
of expropriation. A new loss term accounts for the fact that some of the workers employed in the
expropriated plants must move back into the numeraire sector, resulting in lower wages for those
displaced workers. The loss due to the shrinking capacity of h’s other plants that export to P is
unchanged. The loss from lack of future FDI increases since each new plant would have had a level
of output corresponding to the zero FTA tariﬀ.
4 The Regional versus the Multilateral Regime
4.1 Some Equilibrium considerations
Before investigating in the next subsection how entering a free trade agreement changes the amount
of foreign direct investment in the host country via a change in the net beneﬁto fe x p r o p r i a t i o n ,
it is necessary to discuss some equilibrium considerations. The following proposition considers the
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the number of foreign investment projects (varieties) s for
each type of investment.
16Proposition 1 Considering one type of investment at a time, there is a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium for the number of FDI projects undertaken.
Proof. See appendix.17
Possible equilibria include no FDI or any positive number of varieties over the support of s and
are illustrated in ﬁgures 1.1a-1.1d. Two immediate implications are formalized in the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1 The net beneﬁt of expropriating the ﬁrst foreign-owned plant is positive ⇐⇒ The only
equilibrium entails no foreign direct investment: s∗ =0 .
This lemma follows from the linearity of the net beneﬁto fe x p r o p r i a t i o nBk, k ∈ {ii,ij,iP,Pj,PP},
in the number of foreign investment projects, s.I fBk were a concave function of s (which obtains
when expropriation costs are convex in s), then there are two possible switches in the sign of Bk
and the determination of the equilibrium s∗ would be somewhat more complicated.18 It would,
however, not change the main arguments about the eﬀect of a regime switch below. Moreover, as
argued above, linearity in s is a sensible assumption since it still allows for non-linear expropriation
costs. If Bk were a convex function of s (which obtains when expropriation costs are concave in s),
the analysis would be practically identical to the present one with linearity in s.
Lemma 2 If there are no plants operated by domestic ﬁrms that export to the country whose
nationals are being expropriated, i.e. lh
g =0 ,g∈ {i,P}, then there are only two possible equilibria,
s∗ =0and s∗ = s.
17In order to avoid cluttering the text, all proofs are relegated to the appendix.
18There are ﬁve cases and still three possible equilibria. If Bk < 0 at s, there are three possibilities: Bk < 0 at
s =1and Bk < 0 o v e rt h ee n t i r es u p p o r to fs; Bk < 0 at s =1 ,b u tBk > 0 at some points over the support of s;
Bk > 0 at s =1 , but becoming < 0 at some point before s is reached; given full punishment the equilibrium is always
s
∗ = s.I fBk > 0 at s,t h e ns
∗ =0if Bk > 0 at s =1since by the concavity of Bk,i tc a nn e v e rb e< 0 over the
support of s;i fBk > 0 at s and Bk < 0 at s =1s
∗ will be in the interior, i.e. ∈ [1,s[ and will be determined by
Bk (s
∗)=0 .
17The intuition for this result is straightforward. If home does not export to country i,t h e r ei s
no indirect punishment and thus no indirect cost from expropriating investment from that country.
All other expropriation costs depend on the number of foreign-produced varieties, hence Bk is a
multiple of s.I fBk were positive for the ﬁr s tp l a n t ,w ec a ni n v o k el e m m a1 .I fi tw e r en e g a t i v ef o r
one plant, it would be for any number of plants. In that case it would never pay to expropriate a
plant and the maximum number of investment projects would be realized.19
4.2 Partner Country Investment
In the purely multilateral world, P is like any other third country i, whereas in the regional
regime, the expressions for the net beneﬁt of expropriation diﬀer when we consider investment
from the partner country versus investment from third countries. Comparing expressions (2) and
(6) compares investment from the partner country in the FTA with investment from that country
in the multilateral regime for the case when output is exported back to the multinational’s own
country; comparing expressions (3) and (5) does the same for output exported to a third (non-FTA)
country. Now consider a switch from the multilateral to a regional regime.
Proposition 2 If the equilibrium in the multilateral regime is one without FDI from the future
partner in the FTA, the regime switch results in the possibility of a positive amount of FDI as long
as there is at least one variety exported to the partner; if the equilibrium in the multilateral regime
i so n ew i t hF D If r o mt h ef u t u r ep a r t n e rc o u n t r yi nt h eF T A ,t h er e g i m es w i t c hc a n n o tr e s u l ti na
no-FDI equilibrium.
The proof shows that the drop in the net beneﬁt of expropriation is larger for investment in
varieties that are exported to the partner country’s home market than for investment in varieties
that are exported to a third country market, making this the most likely type of FDI to occur
19If Bk were concave, an interior solution would be possible.
18or expand. The likelihood of a switch in equilibrium from no FDI to FDI is higher, the larger is
the increase in capacity under the FTA and the higher is the pre-FTA tariﬀ. The larger the plant
capacity after implementation of the regional agreement relative to the capacity consistent with
the multilateral tariﬀ, the larger is the drop in Bk following the regime switch. For either type of
investment by ﬁrms from P,t h eN a s ht a r i ﬀ does not matter at all. The size of the commitment
value conferred through conclusion of the FTA only depends on the size of the reduction in tariﬀs.
This result is intuitive because the punishment Nash tariﬀ i st h es a m ei ne i t h e rr e g i m e .T h es o u r c e
of the reduction in the incentive to expropriate and hence the source of the commitment value is
the expanded trade volume following an agreement. The size of the commitment value is directly
related to the size of the tariﬀ reduction and is thus greater, the higher pre-FTA tariﬀs were.
Also, the larger the spread between wages paid in the export sector versus wages in the numeraire
sector, the more likely it is that FDI is induced, since this imposes a greater loss to home if FDI is
not realized. Finally, the more patient a country (a higher β), the larger is the drop in Bk due to
a regime change. This is because the loss of future FDI is discounted less heavily.
If ﬁrms from the future partner country are already producing some varieties in h in the multi-
lateral regime, the switch to a regional regime cannot lead to a reduction in the number of varieties
produced and is likely to result in an increase in the number of varieties. This is formalized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 If the equilibrium in the multilateral regime is one with a positive amount of foreign
investment, the equilibrium in the regional regime has no fewer varieties from the partner country
than the equilibrium in the multilateral regime.
In summary, the number of varieties from the country that becomes home’s partner country in
the agreement can never decrease and is likely to increase because a switch from a no-FDI to an
19FDI equilibrium may occur or, if the equilibrium in the multilateral world is one with FDI from
that country, it must increase unless the maximum number of varieties has already been reached.
4.3 Non-member Country Investment
The next step is to investigate the eﬀect a conclusion of a free trade agreement has on investment
from countries outside the agreement. As far as trade ﬂows are concerned, the theory of regional
integration predicts the possibility that non-member countries may be hurt by regional integration
due to the adverse eﬀects of trade diversion. Can a similar eﬀect occur with respect to investment?
Consider ﬁrst investment by country i 6= P in varieties that are exported back to country i or a
third country j 6= P.
Proposition 4 Investment by country i in varieties that are exported to country i 6= P or j 6= P
is not aﬀected by a free trade agreement between h and P.
This result arises because tariﬀs between i and h are unchanged and no other country is assumed
to react to expropriation of i-ﬁrms.
Now consider the eﬀect of switching from the multilateral to the regional regime on FDI by
country i in a variety that is exported to P.
Proposition 5 For investment from a country that is not part of the regional agreement, but
exports the output of its h-based plants to P, both a switch from a no-FDI equilibrium to an FDI
equilibrium and a switch from a FDI to a no-FDI equilibrium are possible. A switch from a FDI to
a no-FDI equilibrium is more likely if
a) The wage premium in the export sector is not too high.
b) The markup is high.
c) h is impatient (a low β).
20A switch from a no-FDI equilibrium to a FDI equilibrium is more likely if
d) There is a large increase in the direct cost of expropriation.
The proof gives the full set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for either switch to occur.
Intuitively, a large increase in the direct cost of expropriation E lowers the net beneﬁto fe x p r o -
priation upon entering a FTA. Beyond that, there are two opposing forces. On the one hand, the
increased output of each variety due to the tariﬀ reduction increases B as instantaneous proﬁts are
higher. A higher markup (p∗
x −wx) raises these proﬁts further and hence raises the likelihood that
no FDI will occur in the free trade regime even if there previously was a positive amount of FDI
in the multilateral regime. On the other hand, B is lowered as increased output leads to a greater
loss in future FDI. Since the beneﬁt home derives from non-expropriated FDI is the diﬀerence in
wage payments in the export versus the numeraire sector, B is likely to rise in a regime switch, the
lower this beneﬁt is (a low wage premium) and the more heavily these future losses are discounted
(a low β).
Corollary 1 If the equilibrium in the multilateral regime entails a positive amount of investment,
the equilibrium number of varieties in the regional regime may increase or decrease compared to the
number of varieties in the multilateral regime. A decrease is more likely if
a) The wage premium in the export sector is not too high.
b) The markup is high.
c) h is impatient (a low β).
An increase is more likely if
d) There is a large increase in the direct cost of expropriation.
The intuition is the same as for the Proposition 5 since the necessary condition for a fall in the
number of varieties is the same as the one for a switch from a FDI to a no-FDI equilibrium.
21The analysis shows that there is indeed a commitment eﬀect conveyed by the trade agreement.
It has a larger eﬀect on partner country FDI, which is likely to increase and cannot decrease, than
on non-partner FDI, which may even decrease when moving from the multilateral to the regional
regime. The main reason is that the increase in trade between the partners that formed the FTA
translates into a higher indirect punishment value following reneging and hence is able to support
a larger amount of foreign investment. In this sense, the trade diverting eﬀect of a trade agreement
leads to investment diversion as well.
5 Empirical and Policy Implications
The analysis carried out in this paper has some important policy as well as empirical implications. It
also has implications for modelling the eﬀects of regional integration, which generally have focused
on trade creation and trade diversion.
As a greater bilateral trade volume is correlated with a greater increase in FDI, economically
large countries make superior partners in a FTA if a country’s objective of integration is to raise its
attractiveness for FDI. This helps explain why Mexico chose to integrate with the United States,
historically its largest trading partner. But it also helps explain why other Latin American countries
are eager to join this agreement as well in order to reap its apparent beneﬁts. Chile was long
considered a prime candidate, but eﬀorts to include it in NAFTA were not progressing. In response,
Chile has chosen to forge closer trading ties with the EU, its second largest trading partner, rather
than join Mercosur, the free trade area closest to it geographically. While this would have been
surprising under the old regionalism, this paper suggests that such a move is entirely rational.
There are also important testable implications. As a small country concludes a regional agree-
ment with one of its major trading partners, ﬁr s tw es h o u l ds e et r a d eﬂows between the two expand.
22This is a natural result of decreased trade barriers and well established. The model suggests that
subsequently foreign direct investment should increase as well, but along two dimensions. There
should be more ﬁrms entering the market of the small country, and the average scale of those newly
established operations should be increasing relative to the time before the trade agreement. More-
over, the model suggests that the main source of new FDI should be the partner country in the
FTA since the commitment eﬀect is larger with respect to partner investment, whereas the eﬀect
on non-member country investment is ambiguous. The NAFTA and the recent eastward expansion
of the EU are prime candidates to test these predictions.20
The focus of many analyses of the eﬀect of regional economic integration is on the trade eﬀects of
the agreement, often neglecting changes in capital ﬂows. This paper shows how entering a regional
agreement will impact FDI as well. This eﬀect is in addition to the eﬀect the FTA may have on
the terms of trade, and thus consumer and producer surplus, or tariﬀ revenue. The positive eﬀect
of attracting FDI becomes particularly important if other eﬀects tend to create losses. Traditional
analyses that consider trade creation, trade diversion and trade revenue eﬀects emphasize this
possibility. Schiﬀ (1997) argues that the larger the pre-FTA trade volume of a country with the
potential partner has been, the more likely this country will be to lose from entering a regional
agreement due to large losses in tariﬀ revenue. The present analysis suggests that FDI is increasing
in pre-FTA trade volume. Hence, the negative tariﬀ revenue eﬀect may be mitigated by the positive
FDI creation eﬀect. Any general equilibrium analysis of thei m p a c to fF T A sm u s tw e i g ht h er e l a t i v e
importance of these eﬀects.
20Indeed, in a study of FDI in Mexico, Waldkirch (2003) ﬁnds that NAFTA helped raise foreign investment almost
exclusively from the United States and Canada, not from non-partner countries.
236C o n c l u s i o n
Many developing countries have had only limited success in inducing foreign direct investment even
though laws were made more welcoming and nationalistic rhetoric has been toned down. Seeking
closer ties with a large developed trading partner is the latest attempt to increase a country’s
attractiveness for FDI. This paper has shown that the commitment value such integration confers
can indeed raise the level of FDI. Investment from the partner country is most likely to increase,
whereas the eﬀect on investment from countries outside of the agreement is potentially ambiguous.
The desirability of a commitment to regional integration with the intention of attracting FDI
rests on the implicit assumption that foreign investment helps in inducing and sustaining substantial
economic growth and thus development for an underdeveloped country. This insight has been
put forward over ﬁfty years ago in a contribution by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), but only
recently have developing countries started to embrace foreign direct investment as a means of
furthering growth and development. This paper suggests that in order to maximize the commitment
beneﬁts arising from integration, partner countries should not necessarily be selected on the basis
of geography but from among the main trading partners. The two may coincide, as is the case with
Mexico and the United States, but may be quite diﬀerent, as is the case with Chile and the EU.
Future work ought to incorporate the commitment value a regional agreement confers into
more comprehensive analyses of the welfare eﬀects of the new regionalism. In doing so, additional
features of FDI such as its eﬀects on capital accumulation and technology transfer should be taken
into account. Moreover, the costs for a country from such close association with another country
or trading bloc must be considered. The resulting dependency means that not only positive shocks
aﬀecting the larger and more developed trading partner will have spillover eﬀects to the smaller one,
but negative shocks as well. This paper has focused on only one beneﬁcial aspect of commitment.
24Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
First, note that the expressions for the net beneﬁti na l lc a s e sa r eo ft h eg e n e r a lt y p eα ∗ s − γ,
where α i st h eg a i ni nf u t u r ep r o ﬁts from expropriation minus costs D and E and minus the loss in
future FDI; α can be positive or negative; γ is the loss due to lower exports from h-owned plants to
the punishing country, which is independent of s. I.e. the net beneﬁt of expropriation is linear in
s.L e ts∗ be the equilibrium number of investment projects (varieties) of a particular type, which
is bounded by s. Thus start by considering the net beneﬁt of expropriation given that s = s.I f
this expression is negative, Bk (where k ∈ {ii,ij,iP,Pj,PP})c a n n o tb ep o s i t i v ef o ra n ys.T h i si s
easy to see. Bk < 0 ⇐⇒ α∗s−γ < 0.I fα ≤ 0 the expression is < 0 for any sbecause s is positive
(Figure 1.1a illustrates this case). If α > 0,t h e nγ > α ∗ s, and hence γ > α ∗ s ∀s<s.T h e n
expropriation is never an equilibrium and thus s∗ = s (Figure 1.1b illustrates this case).
If Bk = α∗s−γ > 0 (from which immediately follows that α > 0), the equilibrium s∗ depends
on the value of Bk for s =1 .I fBk (s =1 )> 0, the linearity of Bk in s implies that Bk > 0 over
the full support of s,i nw h i c hc a s es∗ =0(implying α > γ). In this case the gain from future
proﬁts of the expropriated plants is so high that it cannot be outweighed by the various costs of
expropriation (Figure 1.1c illustrates this case).
The ﬁnal case to consider is Bk (s) > 0 and Bk (s =1 )< 0 in which case s∗ is unique by the
linearity of Bk and is given by the condition Bk (s∗)=0 . The actual s∗ is then just the next lower
integer and ∈ [1,s[ (Figure 1.1d illustrates this case).
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :
Consider the general functional form of the net beneﬁt of expropriation in all cases, α ∗ s − γ.
Consider s =1 .I fα − γ > 0,t h e nα > 0 and the net beneﬁt of expropriation is strictly increasing
in s: ∂B/∂s = α > 0.S i n c eγ is independent of s, Bk > 0∀s ∈ [1,s].T h i sp r o v e s=⇒.
To prove the reverse, it must be shown that if s∗ =0 ,t h e nBk > 0∀s ∈ [1,s].I f Bk > 0 for
s =1 ,t h e nb yt h eﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sp r o o f ,Bk > 0∀s ∈ [1,s].I f Bk ≤ 0 for s =1 ,t h e ns∗ ≥ 1,
contradicting the earlier assertion that s∗ =0 .T h i sp r o v e s⇐=.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
Again consider the general way of writing Bk as α ∗ s − γ.I flh
g =0 , g ∈ {i,P},t h e nBk = α ∗ s.
If α > 0, Bk is always positive, hence expropriation of any number of plants is beneﬁcial and thus
s∗ =0 , the only equilibrium entails no FDI. If α < 0,t h e nBk < 0 for any s, expropriation is never
beneﬁcial and thus s∗ = s.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Output of plants from P can be of one of two types. It will either be exported back to P’s
own market, or to some third country j. In the latter case, we compare equations (3) and (5).
If the equilibrium in the multilateral regime is one without FDI, by lemma 1 the net beneﬁto f
25expropriation of one plant must be positive, i.e. (setting s =1 ):
Bij =( p∗
x − wx)L(τm) − E [L(τm)] − lh
i [(p∗
x − wn)(L(τm) − L(τN))] −
β
1 − β
(wx − wn)L(τm) > 0
In order for a switch from this equilibrium to one with FDI to be a possibility, the net beneﬁt
of expropriating the ﬁrst plant in the regional regime must be negative. This implies that the net
beneﬁt of expropriation must unambiguously fall when switching from one regime to the other, i.e.
Bij (s =1 )− BPj(s =1 )> 0.21 Assuming that the number of home-owned plants that export to
P does not change in the regime switch, i.e. lh
i = lh
P
22,w eh a v e
Bij (s =1 )− BPj(s =1 )=lh
P (p∗
x − wn)[L(0) − L(τm)]
For lh
P ≥ 1, this expression is unambiguously positive since L(τ) is a decreasing function of τ.
For lh
P =0 , there is no change in the net beneﬁt and thus no equilibrium change can occur.
By the same reasoning, a switch from an FDI to a no FDI-equilibrium is impossible. In that
case, the net beneﬁt of expropriating one plant in the purely multilateral regime must be negative.
For the switch to occur, this net beneﬁt would have to be positive in the regional regime, implying
that the diﬀerence between the two would have to be negative, which was just shown not to be the
case.
If P-owned plants in h export back to their own market, we compare (2) and (6). If the
equilibrium in the multilateral world is one without FDI, the net beneﬁt of expropriation of one
plant must be positive, i.e.
Bii =( p∗
x − wx)L(τm) − D[L(τm)] − E [L(τm)] − lh
i [(p∗
x − wn)(L(τm) − L(τN))] −
β
1 − β
(wx − wn)L(τm) > 0
Again, the net beneﬁt of expropriation must unambiguously fall when switching from one regime
to the other. For lh
i = lh
P,w eh a v e









which is unambiguously positive, even if lh
P =0 ,s i n c ewx >w n and L(τ) is a decreasing
function of τ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
Consider ﬁrst an interior solution, i.e. 0 <s ∗ < s. As shown in the proof to proposition 1, s∗
is determined by the condition Bk (s∗)=0(neglecting the integer requirement for the moment).
Consider the general way of writing Bk as α ∗ s − γ.T h e ns∗ =
γ
α . If investment is of the type of
investment that is exported to a third country j,t h e nγ rises and α is unchanged when switching
regimes (comparing equations (3) and (5)):
α(Bij)=α(BPj)=( p∗
x − wx)L(τm) − E [L(τm)]
21Since discrete regime switches are considered, simply taking derivatives would not be appropriate here.
22This assumes that the only immediate reaction of home tot h eF T Ai st oe x p a n dt h ec a p a c i t yo fi t se x i s t i n g




x − wn)(L(τm) − L(τN))]
< γ (BPj)=lh
P [(p∗
x − wn)(L(0) − L(τN))]
since L is strictly decreasing in τ and lh
i = lh
P (see proof of proposition 2 for an explanation of
this assumption). Due to the integer requirement, the actual s∗ is just the next lowest integer,
which can be the same in the two regimes if the increase in s∗ is suﬃciently small. If s∗ = s in the
multilateral regime already, then this equilibrium is unchanged.
If investment is of the type that is exported back to P,t h e nγ rises and α falls when switching
regimes, again unambiguously increasing s∗ (comparing equations (2) and (6)):
α(Bii)=( p∗





x − wx)L(τm) − D[L(τm)] − E [L(τm)]






x − wn)(L(τm) − L(τN))]
< γ (BPP)=lh
P [(p∗
x − wn)(L(0) − L(τN))]
It is easy to see that α falls because the fourth term is an extra negative term and the ﬁfth
term deducted is larger because L is strictly decreasing in τ.T h et w oγ0s are the same as in the
ﬁrst type of investment. Again, if s∗ = s in the multilateral regime already, then this equilibrium
is unchanged.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
In the case of FDI by country i in a variety that is exported back to i, both the net beneﬁto f
expropriation in the multilateral regime and the net beneﬁt of expropriation in the regional regime
i sg i v e nb ye x p r e s s i o n( 2 ) .H e n c et h e r ei sn oc h a n g ei nBk from a regime switch. In the case of FDI
by country i in a variety that is exported to a third country market j 6= P, both the net beneﬁto f
expropriation in the multilateral regime and the net beneﬁt of expropriation in the regional regime
is given by expression (3). Hence there is no change in Bk from a regime switch.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :
The net beneﬁt of expropriation for this case is given by equation (3) for the multilateral regime and
equation (4) for the free trade regime. Again, by lemma 1, the equilibrium will entail no FDI if Bk
is positive for s =1 , but will entail a positive amount of FDI if Bk is nonpositive for s =1 . Hence,
suﬃcient conditions for a switch from a no-FDI to a FDI {from a FDI to a no-FDI} equilibrium to
occur are:
Bij =( p∗
x − wx)L(τm) − E [L(τm)] − lh
i [(p∗
x − wn)(L(τm) − L(τN))] −
β
1 − β
(wx − wn)L(τm) > {<}0
BiP =( p∗
x − wx)L(0) − E [L(0)] − lh
i [(p∗
x − wn)(L(τm) − L(τN))] −
β
1 − β
(wx − wn)L(0) < {>}0
27A necessary condition for a switch from a no-FDI to a FDI {from a FDI to a no-FDI} equilibrium
to occur is that the net beneﬁt of expropriation of the ﬁrst plant must fall {rise}. Assuming that
the number of home-owned varieties exported to i does not change in the regime switch, we have:
Bij (s =1 )− BiP (s =1 ) = ( p∗
x − wx)[L(τm) − L(0)]
+E [L(0)] − E [L(τm)] +
β (wx − wn)
1 − β
[L(0) − L(τm)]














The change in the direct cost of expropriation, E [L(0)] − E [L(τm)], is positive, as is the
diﬀerence between the number of workers employed, [L(0) − L(τm)]. The term in square brackets
is ambiguous in sign. For the whole expression to be negative (so that a switch from a FDI to a






reveals that this is more likely to hold the lower β,t h el a r g e rp∗
x−wx (the markup) and the smaller
wx − wn.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 :
Consider ﬁrst an interior solution, i.e. 0 <s ∗ < s. As shown in the proof to proposition 1, s∗
is determined by the condition Bk (s∗)=0(neglecting the integer requirement for the moment).
Consider the general way of writing Bk as α ∗ s − γ.T h e ns∗ =
γ
α . With investment of the type
considered, γ is unchanged (comparing equations (3) and (4)):
γ (Bij)=γ (BiP)=lh
i [(p∗
x − wn)(L(τm) − L(τN))] if lh
i = lh
P
A necessary condition for s∗ to rise {fall}is then for α to fall {rise}:
α(Bij) − α(BiP)=( p∗
x − wx)[L(τm) − L(0)]
+E [L(0)] − E [L(τm)] +
β (wx − wn)
1 − β
[L(0) − L(τm)]














which is the same condition as in proposition 6. Hence, it gives the same implications.
If s∗ = s in the multilateral regime, by the same argument it is possible that s∗ falls enough so
that it is < s.
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31Figure 1: Diﬀerent Scenarios for the Equilibrium Number of Varieties
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a) Equilibrium number of varieties s* = s 
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                 -γ                                                                                   s                      s 
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b) Equilibrium number of varieties s* = s 
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                 -γ 
c) Equilibrium number of varieties s* = 0 
               Bk 
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                 -γ 
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d) Equilibrium number of varieties s* ∈ [1, s [ 
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                 -γ 
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